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QUESTION PRESENTED 
Under Utah law, did the trial court err in granting Graffs summary 
judgment, where the only issue Developers presented in their Opposition to 
Summary Judgment was partial performance, and when said exception was clearly 
inapplicable in the Developers' case? 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
QUESTION PRESENTED ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES v 
OPINIONS BELOW 1 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 11 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 11 
ARGUMENT 13 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE THE ONLY ISSUE 
APPELLANTS PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR REVIEW WAS 
THE PARTIAL PERFORMANCE EXCEPTION TO THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS, AND APPELLANTS CLEARLY DID 
NOT PLEAD SUFFICIENT FACTS TO MEET THE STRINGENT 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE PARTIAL PERFORMANCE 
EXCEPTION 13 
A. The trial court did not err in granting Graffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment when the Developers presented only the 
argument that the partial performance exception overcame the 
statute of frauds defense. 13 
B. Appellants failed to plead facts sufficient to meet the stringent 
case law requirements for the partial performance exception 
to a statute of frauds defense. 16 
II. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE REMAINING EQUITABLE 
CLAIMS WERE PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL 
COURT AND PRESERVED FOR APPEAL, THIS COURT 
SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE RECOVERY WOULD BE 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 20 
- in -
A. Developers' equitable claims are barred by Utah's statute of 
frauds because, the Developers' equitable claims attempt to 
create an interest which concerns real property. 20 
B. Max Graff did not not expressly and unambiguously waive 
the statute of frauds. 27 
C. Even if the statute of frauds wasn't applicable, all of 
Appellants' claims would fail as a matter oflaw. 28 
III. APPELLANTS HAVE BROUGHT A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL IN 
CONTRAVENTION OF RULE 33 OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 31 
A. Appellants' Brief was "not grounded in fact, not warranted 
by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law." 32 
B. Appellants' attitude toward this appeal is evidently frivolous 
as evidenced by the disorganized nature of Appellants' Brief 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Allen v. Hall, 148 P.3d 939, 945 (Utah 2006) 25 
Am. Towers Owners'Ass'n. v. CCIMech., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996) 26 
Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987) 14, 15 
David Early Group, Inc. v. BFS Retail & Commer. Operations, LLC, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5694 (D. Utah Jan. 25, 2008) 17 
Eldridge v. Farnsworth, 166 P.3d 639 (Utah App. 2007) 14 
F. C. Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1997) 27, 28 
Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d45 (Utah 1974) 30 
Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636 (Utah 1979) 17 
Harper v. Evans, 185 P.3d 573 (Utah App. 2008) * 13 
Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785 (Utah App. 1987) 31 
Mackay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998) 32, 33, 41 
McKay Dee Credit Union v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp, 2008 WL 
1970944 (Utah App. 2008) 24 
Medesco, Inc. v. LNA Intern. Inc., 762 F.Supp. 920 (D. Utah 1991) 27 
Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952) 29 
Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742 (Utah 2002) 16 
Themy v. Seagull Enter., Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979) 11 
Utah State Coalition ofSr. Citizens v. Utah Power and Light Co., 116 P.2d 
632 (Utah 1989) 11 
STATUTES 
U.C.A. §25-5-1 (2008) 22 
- v 
U.C.A. §25-5-3 (2008) 23 
U.C.A. 25-5-1 (2008) 20 
U.C.A. 78A-4-103(2)0) (2008) 1 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
37 C.J.S., Statute of Frauds, § 250 (1943) 28 
Susan Haack, Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge University Press, 1978 29 
- vi -
OPINIONS BELOW 
The Order of the district court may be found on pages 1264-73 of the Record. The 
Order was not part of the record at the time Appellants filed their Brief. (R. at 1262-63.) 
However, it is now included in the Supplement to the Record. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Ann. sec. 78A-4-103(2)(j).1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
While Appellants couch the issue for appeal in broad terms - "[wjhether the trial 
court correctly granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs/Appellees Graffs" - the 
Appellants in fact only preserved one issue - partial performance - for appeal. 
Appellant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, dated March 19, 
2007, raised only the issue of partial performance, and Appellants point to this 
memorandum exclusively as its citation to the record showing the issue preserved in the 
trial court. (R. at 1003-24; Appellants' Brief at p. 2.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellees are essentially in agreement with Appellants that their statement of the 
procedural history of the case is accurate. The one exception is that Appellants did not 
1
 U.C.A. § 78-2a-3 is newly renumbered as U.C.A. § 78A-4-103. 
1 
mention that their Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, dated March 
19, 2007, preserved only the issue of partial performance. (R. at 1003-24.) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case centers on the failed sale of approximately 27.5 acres of land in or near 
American Fork, Utah. (Appellants' Brief at p. 6; See also R. at 731-34.) 
The Appellees in this action are members of the Graff family. For three 
generations the Graffs have owned a family farm ("Graff Farm") consisting of 27.5 acres 
in the environs of American Fork, Utah. (R. at 827, f^ 3.) The patriarch of the Graff family 
is Max Graff, who is now 74 years old. (Id. at f^ 4.) Max's father., George, purchased the 
land with an eye toward dairy farming. (R. at 826, ^ } 5.) Those dairy operations 
commenced in 1944. Id. Though the farm was modest in size, the Graff family has 
supported itself by not only dairy but also cattle operations. (Id. at % 5-6.) These 
operations were made possible through leasing of neighboring farmland for feed 
production. (Id. at % 7-8.) However, over the decades, real eslate in Utah County 
increased in value to the point that in 2004 the Graffs began to seriously consider selling 
their farm. (Id. at TJ 10.) Specifically, the undeveloped areas between Pleasant Grove and 
American Fork became an object of interest for real estate investors. 
Not far from the Graff Farm lived the Robinson family, in fact, one of the 
Robinson's sons, David Robinson, trained horses for Max Graff. (R. at 380, j^ 13.) 
Robinson was also involved with an entity known as the Fusion Group ("Fusion") (R. at 
382, f 2.) Fusion's business objective was real estate development. (R. at 382 [^ 3.) 
2 
In 2004, Robinson approached Max Graff with a business proposal: Fusion wanted 
to facilitate the purchase of the Graff Farm. (Id. at f 4.) In fact, Fusion had big plans for 
to develop a substantial real estate development project called the Vintaro Project 
("Project") that included the Graff Farm and surrounding properties. (R. at 1, 381 f^ 7.) 
Specifically, Robinson was, in his own words, "responsible for land acquisition for 
Fusion Group, LLC, ("Fusion") and its related entities with respect to the Project." (R. at 
382 TI2.) The entities Robinson was referring to are the other two Appellants in this 
action: Gateway Farms, LLC ("Gateway"), and Naterra West ("Naterra"). (Id. at ^ 3.) 
Fusion owns a 100% interest in Gateway and a 5% minority interest in Naterra. (R. at 
83.) Naterra and Gateway are essentially the same group of individuals, acting as agents 
for Fusion Group. (R. at 826) Collectively, Appellants Gateway, Naterra and Fusion will 
be referred to as "Developers." (see generally R. at 1014-24 where Appellants themselves 
refer to Naterra, Gateway, and Fusion collectively as "Developers.") 
This lawsuit centers on negotiations between Developers and the Graffs over four 
different parcels of land. (R. at 1-20, 26 Tf 7.) While the first set of contracts were signed 
on December 10, 2004 (R. at 382 If 2), Developers failed to fulfill their contractual 
obligations and subsequent negotiations continued for the following year and a half. (R. 
at 378 T| 21.) The first set of contracts was between Gateway and Graffs, while the 
subsequent contracts were between Naterra and the Graffs. (R. at 380-381 Tflf 9-10.) 
The relevant REPCs, which applied to all four parcels of land, include: 
Gateway REPC-1 and the first Addendum was signed December 10, 2004, and set 
closing for January 31, 2005. (R. at 29-40.) 
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Gateway Addendum 2 was signed January 28, 2005, and extended closing to April 
1,2005. (R. at 123.) 
Gateway Addendum 3 was signed March 31, 2005, and extended closing to 
October 1, 2005. (R. at 122.) 
At this point Naterra took over negotiations with the Graffs. Naterra West REPC-1 
and the first Addendum was signed May 25, 2005, and set closing for December 31, 
2005. (R. at 3-20.) 
Naterra Addendum 2 was signed after the expiration of the previous contract, on 
April 22, 2006, and extended the closing deadline to May 31, 2006. (R. at 1.) 
Specifically, §2 provided that: 
...[T]he Closing must occur on or prior to May 31, 2006. If the appraisal or 
other financing conditions needed for acquisition of the Properties have not 
been met before May 31, 2006 for reasons outside the control of the 
Buyer, then Closing may be deferred until no later than June 30, 2006. 
Buyer to provide Sellers at least 10 days notice prior to closing.... In the 
event the Closing does not take place as required b> this paragraph, 
then the RECP's [sic] shall automatically terminate as of the date to 
closing should have taken place. 
(R. at 1 If 2.) (Emphasis added.) 
A timeline to illustrate the sequence of REPCs and addenda (R. at 729) is attached 
as Appendix A. 
According to Developers' vague representation on the record, "[o]n several 
occasions between May 25, 2005 and June 22, 2006 including after May 31, 2006" 
Developers discussed with one of the Sellers, Max Graff, "possible funding options to 
purchase the property, including [Developers] obtaining a bank loan or in the alternative, 
4 
obtaining a loan from other investors or various 'hard money5 lenders." (R. at 380, f 15.) 
Construing this statement in the light most favorable to Developers, sometime in the year 
prior to the closing and sometime in the 22 days leading up to the closing deadline, 
Developers represented to a single Seller, Max Graff, that Developers were considering 
various funding options, including hard money investors. Id. 
Further, Developers again informed the same single Seller, Max Graff, some time 
prior to June 30, 2006 "that if [Developers] could not obtain financing from the preferred 
bank loan by the closing deadline, [Developers] would be able to close on the purchase of 
the property through these various investors or 'hard money lenders.'" (R. at 379, ^ 18.) 
Read in the light most favorable to the Developers, this statement can mean no more than 
sometime before (maybe a year before, or maybe one day before) June 30, 2006 
Developers informed a single seller (Max Graff) that if the bank loan fell through, other 
options were available to Developers that could allow them to close on the property prior 
to the closing deadline. 
The Record does not show any attempt by the Developers to provide the Graffs "at 
least 10 days notice prior to closing" as required by the contract. (R. at 1 % 2.) In fact, the 
only evidence regarding the contractually required notice is in the final paragraph of 
Robinson's affidavit; a tacit admission that Developers failed to give the required notice, 
which reads 
My understanding of the 10 days notice as contained in Addendum 2 
required that if the buyers wanted to close earlier than May 31, 2006 or 
before the final closing date of June 30, 2006, the buyers were to give 10 
days notice to allow closing arrangements to be made prior to June 30, 
5 
2006. I understood that the contract called for a June 30, 2006 closing 
unless notice of an earlier closing was given. 
The addendum, however, clearly states that Developers were required to give 10 days 
notice prior to closing, without any qualification. (R. at 1, ^ f 2.) Further, Robinson's 
characterization of the agreement as calling for a June, 30, 2006 closing is clearly 
erroneous, as the contract called for a May 31, 2006 closing unless circumstances beyond 
the control of the Developer required a later closing, and in that case, the ultimate 
deadline could be extended to no later than June 30, 1006. Id. Developers' attempt to 
introduce parol evidence, in the form of Robinson's affidavit, does not change the clear 
meaning of the contract. (R. at 375, ]f 34.) 
On June 22, 2006, twenty two days after the May 31, 2006 deadline and just eight 
days (and coincidently, two days too late for ten days' notice) prior to the final June 30l 
deadline, (R. at 1, If 2) Developer representative David Robinson again contacted one of 
the sellers, Max Graff, and informed Max that "due to delays in Ihe various appraisals, 
city approvals, including a road mylar approval, that the closing, using the preferred bank 
loan, would need to be deferred into the first part of July, 2006." (R. at 378, f 21). 
According to Developers, on June 22, 2006, Max Graff responded by telling 
Robinson to contact Graffs attorney, Don Gilbert "to work things out concerning closing 
arrangements." (R. at 378, ^  22). Further, Developers assert that through "tone, body 
language and actions" Max indicated to Robinson "that everything would be fine with 
closing in July, 2006." (R. at 378-377,1 23.) 
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It is important to note the Developers characterize this conversation in their Brief 
differently than it appears in the record. 
Although it appears that Developers could have obtained financing through hard 
money lenders prior to May 31st, 2006 and thus the failure to close on or before May 31, 
2006 was entirely within the control of the Developers, (supra) for the purposes of this 
appeal Graffs shall assume that closing did not occur prior to May 31, 2006 due to 
"reasons outside the control o f Developers, and, according to the contract terms, the 
closing may have been extended to no later than the ultimate deadline of June 30th. 
It is undisputed that Developers were unable to contact Graffs' attorney after June 
22nd by telephone or e-mail to get an extension. (R. at 376, f^ 27.) 
While disputing that an oral extension was ever granted to Developers, Graffs 
assume, for the purposes of this appeal, that the representation by Max Graff that 
Developers should contact Graffs' attorney and Max Graffs tone and body language 
were somehow sufficient to create some type of oral agreement between Developers and 
Graffs. Id 
It is undisputed that "after the [June 30, 2006] closing deadline passed, the Graffs 
informed Developers that they were not willing to take less than $250,000 per acre for the 
On page 15 of Appellant's Brief, Appellants state that Max told David to "contact Don 
Gilbert, the Graffs' attorney, about extending the June 30, 2006 closing deadline and 
making closing arrangements." (Emphasis added.) Developers again mischaracterize the 
Record on page 11 of their Brief by saying that, in a later conversation "Max indicated 
that he had not heard from Gilbert and again told David that he should continue to 
attempt to contact Gilbert concerning extension and closing arrangements." (Emphasis 
added.) Somewhere between the affidavit and the Brief Appellants have managed to put 
the words "extension" into Max Graffs mouth, not only once, but twice. 
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subject property," whereas the previous contract price was approximately $171,000 per 
acre. (R. at 375, lfl[ 32-33.) On July 18, 2006, Naterra filed a notice of interest in the 
property that was subject to these agreements. See Appendix B. 
In response to the notice of interest, Graffs filed suit on July 28, 2006 seeking to 
collect liquidated damages in the amount of $185,000 under the Naterra REPC, as well as 
a declaratory judgment that the REPC had terminated by its own terms on May 31, 2006. 
(R. at 23.) 
On August 9, 2006, Naterra filed a lis pendens (R. at 63-68) and answered Graffs' 
complaint, asserting in counterclaim five causes of action: (1) detrimental reliance, (2) 
fraud, (3) breach of good faith and fair dealing, (4) unjust enrichment, and (5) conspiracy. 
(R. at 28-62.) Subsequently, on September 5, 2006, Gateway Farms, LLC, and Fusion 
Group, LLC, moved to intervene as plaintiffs (R. at 82-137), and on October 25, 2006, 
they filed a Complaint in Intervention against the Graffs. (R. at 217-282.) 
On February 5, 2007, the Graffs moved for summary judgment against 
Developers, arguing that the statute of frauds defeated the Developers' counterclaims. (R. 
at 852-981.) 
Developers opposed the motion on March 22, 2007, arguing that Developers 
believed that an oral agreement had been reached between the Parties granting them some 
sort of extension based "on the voice tone, body language, and oral communications of 
Max Graff in June, 2006; specifically Max Graffs instructions to plaintiffs to work 
things out with his attorney concerning arrangements for closing." (R. at 1023, internal 
quotation marks omitted.) Further, Developers argue that by attempting, but failing, to 
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contact Graffs' attorney (R. at 1017) that the "Developers... overcome the statute of 
frauds based on its performance of the agreement reached by Max Graff and Dave 
Robinson." (R. at 1018.) The Developers relied exclusively on the doctrine of partial 
performance to defeat the Graffs' statute of frauds defense. (R. at 1002-24.) 
While the Developers erroneously claim in their Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment that many facts that the Graffs vigorously 
dispute are "undisputed," Graffs particularly object to the first paragraph on page 1017 of 
the Record which states that "In the present matter, it is undisputed that Dave Robinson 
informed Max Graff that they were ready willing to close on the purchase of the property 
through the various 'hard money' investors. (Robinson Aff. ^ 11, 15, 18 and 29.)" 
Careful examination of those paragraphs shows that the Developers being ready, willing 
and able to close was NOT specifically communicated to the Graffs in any way. Id. The 
affidavit only refers to hard money investors in general discussions about funding options 
in paragraphs 15 and 18, and a declarative statement in paragraph 29 that "On June 30, 
2006, Naterra was ready, willing and able to close." (R. at 379 and 377.) 
The Graffs filed a reply memorandum on April 12, 2007 and filed a request to 
submit the motion on the same day. (R. at 1062-69; 1070-72.) 
On May 14, 2007, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Graffs' motion. (R. at 
1165.) Two months later, on July 10, 2007, the trial court issued its Order holding that the 
statute of frauds defeated all of Developers' claims and counterclaims. (R. at 1152-66.) 
The Graffs moved on November 2, 2007, for the order to be made final under Rule 54(b). 
(R. at 1201-29.) The trial court granted that motion on December 10, 2007. (R. at 1258-
9 
60.) Then on January 15, 2008, the trial court issued an Amended Order, certifying it 
under Rule 54(b) as final and appealable. (R. at 1265-73.) 
The trial court, in its order, found that the alleged oral agreement was not clear in 
its language or its terms, nor did it even address whether an extension was granted, or for 
how long, but suggested at best, "some form of an extension." (see Appendix C, or R. at 
1264-73.) Further, the alleged oral agreement did not contain an express waiver of the 
statute of frauds. Id. Assuming, however, that such an oral agreement existed, the trial 
court held that all of Developer's claims and/or causes of action should be dismissed 
because "Developer's failure to close...was not arguably shown as exclusively based on 
reliance upon on [sic] the alleged oral agreement" and that non-action does not constitute 
partial performance under Utah law. Id. Further, "[t]he allegations of part-performance in 
terms of calling Graffs' attorney and sending him e-mail are insufficient part performance 
because these are not substantial and are 'word oriented' not 'act oriented.'" Id. The court 
noted, in addition, "it would be expected, that contact with Graffs attorney would occur 
(e.g. he was to prepare the closing documents, etc.) and therefore the e-mail and phone 
calls were not adequately shown as exclusively based on reliance upon on [sic] the 
alleged oral agreement." Id. 
Developers filed their Notice of Appeal on January 8, 2008, prior to the issuance 
of the final Order of the trial court. (R. at 1261-63.) 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a case disposed of in the district court by summary judgment, this 
Court should consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, and 
affirm only where it appears there is no genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact, 
or where, even according to the facts as contended by the losing party, the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 
526, 529-30, (Utah, 1979). 
Further, in deciding whether the trial court properly granted judgment as a matter 
of law to the prevailing party, this Court should give no deference to the trial court's view 
of the law; but review it for correctness. Utah State Coalition ofSr. Citizens v. Utah 
Power and Light Co., 776 P.2d 632 (Utah, 1989). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling because the only argument 
Developers properly placed before the trial court (the partial performance exception to 
the statute of frauds) fails as a matter of law. Developers tacitly concede that the statute 
of frauds applies, but assert that the partial performance exception overcomes the Graffs 
statute of frauds defense. (R. at 1015-18.) Developers' partial performance argument, 
however, fails as a matter of law because (1) the alleged oral contract and its terms were 
not clear and definite, (2) the alleged acts done in performance of the contract were not 
equally clear and definite, nor did Developers show that such acts would not have been 
performed had the contract not existed, and, finally, (3) failure to enforce the contract 
would not result in a fraud on the Developers. Further, partial performance is the only 
argument Developers cite as preserved. (See Appellant's Br. at p. 2 where Developers 
reference only their Memorandum in Opposition as their citation to the record showing 
which issues were preserved in trial court.) 
Although the Developers' new unjust enrichment claim was not properly 
presented to the trial court nor preserved for appeal, Developers in their Brief, however, 
go to great lengths in an attempt to resurrect their claim of unjust enrichment as well as 
the rest of their equitable counterclaims, by claiming that the statute of frauds is 
inapplicable to these claims (Appellants' Br. at 22-26.) Even if this Court were to come 
to the conclusion that Developers properly presented and preserved these claims this 
Court should affirm the trial court's ruling because (1) the statute of frauds bars any such 
recovery, and (2) each of these claims fail as a matter of law. 
Finally, this Court should award the Appellee attorney's fees and punitive 
damages for being required to defend this frivolous appeal that v/as "not grounded in fact, 
not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, 
or reverse existing law." The frivolity with which Developers' counsel have treated this 
case is also evident from the poorly drafted nature of their Brief - it is riddled with 
mischaracterizations and erroneous citations to the Record. The Appellee has expended 
many hours sifting through the Record in an often futile effort of figuring out what 
Developers' Brief was actually citing to. Such behavior on the part of Developers' 
counsel merits sanctions from this Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE THE ONLY ISSUE 
APPELLANTS PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR REVIEW WAS THE PARTIAL 
PERFORMANCE EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, AND 
APPELLANTS CLEARLY DID NOT PLEAD SUFFICIENT FACTS TO MEET 
THE STRINGENT REQUIREMENTS OF THE PARTIAL PERFORMANCE 
EXCEPTION. 
Developers, by presenting the single issue of the partial performance exception to 
the statute of frauds to the trial court prior to the trial court's ruling, waived any and all 
remaining arguments it might have brought on appeal. Developers' argument that the 
partial performance exception to the statute of frauds fails because Developers have not 
plead facts sufficient to meet the stringent requirements of the partial performance 
exception, such as the requirement that the terms of the oral agreement be clear and 
definite, and that the action taken must clearly be a result of that agreement. 
A. The trial court did not err in granting Graffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment when the Developers presented only the argument that the partial 
performance exception overcame the statute of frauds defense. 
Developers failed to present and preserve all of their equitable claims for appeal 
and thus waived all but the partial performance claims. "To allow the trial judge the 
opportunity to rule on a particular issue, the issue must be specifically raised in a timely 
fashion and with supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Harper v. Evans, 185 
P.3d 573, 577 -578 (Utah App. 2008). In a motion for summary judgment, that 
opportunity comes in the opposing party's memorandum in opposition. Id. at 578. 
Hence, an appellant's opposition to summary judgment is the crucial place to preserve an 
issue. Id., at 578 (Issue not preserved when appellant's "opposition to summary 
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judgment in the district court purported to abandon " that claim.); see also Eldridge v. 
Farnsworth, 166 P.3d 639, 649 -650 (Utah App. 2007) (issue not preserved for appeal 
when appellant did not rely on that issue in its opposition to motion for summary 
judgment and did not mention the issue again until its motion to reconsider.) 
Where it is conceivable that an argument was raised, and thus preserved, in oral 
argument, the appellant must have evidence that such arguments were made. Busch 
Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987) ("when an 
argument has not been made in the trial court, we will not allow it to be raised on appeal. 
Although it is conceivable that these arguments were raised orally in the hearing on the 
motion for summary judgment, there is nothing in the record to support that 
possibility.") (Emphasis added.) 
Developers' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment presented the single argument of partial performance as an exception to the 
statute of frauds to the trial court. (R. at 1003-24.) Therefore, this was the only argument 
properly before the trial court and thus preserved for appeal. Busch, 743 P.2d 1219. By 
failing to present and thus preserve any other arguments any attempt by the Developers to 
resurrect these arguments in their Brief must fail. Id. 
Developers opposed Graffs' motion for summary judgment on March 22, 2007, 
arguing only the issue of partial performance. In fact, like Eldridge, Developers appear to 
abandon all other arguments including any claim for unjust enrichment. Further, by 
stating in its Opposition: 
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Plaintiffs also correctly identify some [emphasis in original] of the 
circumstances when the statute of frauds may be overcome, such as 
detrimental reliance, equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel and fraud 
While Developers may overcome the statute of frauds based on the 
foregoing circumstances, Developers also overcome the statute of frauds 
based on its performance of the agreement reached by Max Graff and Dave 
Robinson. 
(Emphasis added, internal citations omitted.) (R. at 1018.) The Developers went on to 
ONLY address the partial performance issue in their Memorandum in Opposition. (R. at 
1003-24.) Not only did Developers fail to address any remaining arguments regarding the 
Graffs' statute of frauds defense, but Developers admitted that these claims "may" 
overcome the statute of frauds - not "will" - and, as a result, implicitly abandoned those 
arguments. (R. at 1018.) 
Even if Developers were to contend that the other equitable claims arguments 
were raised, and thus preserved, in oral argument, said argument would also fail. Busch, 
743 P.2d 1219. Like the appellant in Busch who could not prove what was said at oral 
arguments, Developers did not request a transcript and thus there is no transcript of oral 
arguments in the Record for appeal. (R. at 1187.) 
Developers chose to rely exclusively in their Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the partial performance exception to the 
statute of frauds defense, and, as a result, failed to present and preserve their remaining 
arguments. (R. at 1003-24.) 
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B. Appellants failed to plead facts sufficient to meet the stringent case law 
requirements for the partial performance exception to a statute of frauds 
defense. 
In order to prevail using the partial performance exception to a statute of frauds 
defense, Developers must meet the stringent requirements of this exception. Developers 
quite properly pointed out on page 18 of their Brief that the 
standard for partial performance in Utah provides that c[l] the oral contract 
and its terms must be clear and definite; [2] the act is done in performance 
of the contract must be equally clear and definite; and [3] the acts must be 
in reliance on the contract.'.... Moreover, the acts in reliance must be such 
that '(a) they would not have been performed had the contract not existed, 
and (b) the failure to perform on the part of the promisor would result in 
fraud on the performer who relied, since damages would be inadequate.' 
(Citing Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002), internal quotations and citations 
omitted.) It is important to note that all four requirements are essential, and the failure of 
the Developers to meet any one of these requirements makes the claim of partial 
performance fail as a matter of law. Id. The trial court properly found that the Developers 
failed to meet, not just one, but each and every one of these requirements. (R. at 1264-
73.) 
[1] The trial court properly found that oral agreement as alleged and its terms were 
far from clear and definite. (R. at 1271-72, Tfl| 1, 3.) Developers argued in its 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, that 
Developers believed that an oral agreement had been reached between the Parties 
granting them some sort of extension based "on the voice tone, body language, and oral 
communications of Max Graff in June, 2006; specifically Max Graffs instructions to 
plaintiffs to work things out with his attorney concerning arrangements for closing." (R. 
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at 1023, 1f 2, internal quotation marks omitted.) The words alleged by David Robinson in 
his affidavit (unlike the Brief3) do NOT clearly and definitely address whether an 
extension was granted. (R. at 375-73.) Further, Developers never claimed that critical 
terms of the extension were discussed, such as the length of the extension or 
consideration. Id. Therefore, as a matter of law, the terms of the contract, as Judge 
Howard ruled, are far from clear and definite, thereby defeating the Appellants' claims 
that the partial performance exception to the statute of frauds applies to this case. (R. at 
I27l-72,1f1l 1,3.) 
Moreover, the oral agreement as alleged by the Developers is not an oral contract 
at all, but is at most an agreement to agree, which is unenforceable as a matter of law. 
David Early Group, Inc. v. BFS Retail & Commer. Operations, LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5694 (D. Utah Jan. 25, 2008). 
An agreement to agree at a later date is unenforceable as a matter of 
law...."So long as there is any uncertainty or indefiniteness, or future 
negotiations or considerations to be had between the parties, there is not a 
completed contract. In fact, there is no contract at all."; see also Harmon v. 
Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1979) ("Such agreements to agree are 
generally unenforceable because they leave open material terms for future 
consideration, and the courts cannot create these terms for the parties.") 
Like the Utah District Court in David Early and Harmon that refused to create terms for 
the parties, the missing essential terms of the alleged extension cannot be inferred from 
the comments or actions of either party. 
[2] The trial court properly found that non-action and word-based actions are 
insufficient to reach the conclusion that the act done in performance of the contract is 
See footnote 2, above. 
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clear and definite. (R. at 1270-72, fflf 2, 5-8.) Despite the fact that Developers never 
raised the issue that "not closing" was an act made in reliance on the alleged oral 
agreement, the trial court found that this non-action was nol sufficiently clear and definite 
to meet the requirements of the second prong of the standard. (R. at 1271, f^ 6.) It is the 
general rule in Utah that to avoid enforcement of the statute of frauds, non-action may 
not constitute partial performance or reliance upon an oral agreement. Id. As a 
matter of law, then, a party's failure to close before the deadline is legally insufficient to 
establish partial performance as an exception to the statute of frauds in this case. Id. 
Further, the trial court went on to hold that calling Graffs' attorney and sending him e-
mail are not sufficiently clear and definite to meet the second prong of the standard 
because they are "word oriented" not "act oriented" {Id. at % 7.) 
[3] (a) The trial court found that the acts Developers might point to as evidence of 
their reliance on the contract were not done such that (a) they would not have been 
performed had the contract not existed. (R. at 1270, *[  8.) The trial court properly pointed 
out that Developers might not have closed for myriad other reasons including, the lack of 
funding, a decision not to go forward with the transaction, or other reasons wholly apart 
from the alleged oral agreement. Id. Further, the court properly noted that attempts to 
contact Graffs' attorney would be expected because he was preparing the closing 
documents etc. and therefore the emails and phone calls would still have been made if the 
contract had not existed. Id. Developers themselves even mentioned throughout the 
Record that they had several reasons for attempting to contact the Graffs' attorney 
including setting a closing date, determining the water rights, etc. (R. at 376-382 f^ f 6, 13-
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20, 30.) Therefore, as a matter of law, as Judge Howard ruled, the Developers have failed 
to meet their burden in showing that they would not have attempted to perform if the 
purported oral contract had not existed. (R. at 1264-73.) 
[3](b) Finally, Developers failed to allege in their Brief or elsewhere in the 
Record that the failure of the Graffs to perform on the alleged agreement to extend would 
result in a fraud on the Developers. First, had Developers tendered their notice to close on 
June 20th (within the ten days required by the written contract) or even on June 22nd 
(when they told the Graffs that they again failed to obtain the preferred bank financing 
and could not close until mid-July), then the Developers might have purchased the 
property and there would be no problem today. 
Instead, Developers spend a great deal of their Brief alleging stonewalling efforts 
that prevented them from closing. (Appellant's Brief at 13, 15-17.) Developers fail to 
mention, however, that whether or not Don Gilbert was in the state or even 
incommunicado could not have stopped the Developers from tendering their 
readiness to close according to the contract. If, after Developers had tendered their 
readiness to close, Don Gilbert had failed to close, then the Developers would have an 
action against the Graffs for breach of contract, (which is not alleged by the Developers). 
The opposite occurred, however. The Developers failed to tender their readiness to 
close, and failed to close, assuming that the Graffs would grant them one more extension 
after a year and a half of holdups. (R. at 377, f^ 23, see also the timeline in Appendix A.) 
Then Developers attempt to blame the Graffs for misleading them through the voice tone, 
body language, and instructions to Developers to work things out with Graffs attorney 
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concerning arrangements for closing. (R. at 1023.) No fraud occurred on the Developers 
because they chose to disregard the contract that they signed, and relied on an alleged 
oral agreement with no set terms. (R. at 377123.) Therefore, as a matter of law, 
Developers failed to show how the failure of the Graffs to extend the deadline resulted in 
a fraud on the Developers, again defeating the Developers' claims that the partial 
performance exception to the statute of frauds applies to this case. 
II. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE REMAINING EQUITABLE CLAIMS WERE 
PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT AND PRESERVED FOR 
APPEAL, THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE RECOVERY WOULD 
BE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Even were the remaining equitable claims preserved, they would by barred by 
Utah's statute of frauds. 
A. Developers' equitable claims are barred by Utah's statute of frauds because, 
the Developers' equitable claims attempt to create an interest which 
concerns real property. 
Section 25-5-1 of the Utah Code specifically states that: 
No estate or interest in real property,... or power over or concerning 
real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared [unless] authorized by writing. 
Developers, through their equitable claims are attempting to create an interest in, 
or power over the Graffs' property which is not authorized by writing. This attempt to 
create an interest in real property is contrary to the Utah law. Through a contortion of 
both legal authority and the facts in this case, Developers attempt to persuade this Court 
that the Developers have established some type of equitable righls in the Graffs' property, 
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and since those equitable claims were not addressed by the Graffs or the trial court, this 
Court should find that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on those 
claims. (Appellants' Br. at 22.) 
Developers state in their Brief that "DEVELOPERS' EQUITABLE CLAIMS 
WERE NOT BRIEFED OR ARGUED. AND DEVELOPERS' EQUITABLE CLAIMS 
ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. THEREFORE, THE COURT 
IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DEVELOPERS' 
EQUITABLE CLAIMS." (Appellants' Br. at 22.) Developers seem to have forgotten that 
after the trial court's hearing on the Graffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, but before 
the trial court issued its initial Order (R. at 1166), the Developers filed an Amended 
Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Order on their Motion for Summary Judgment on June 
7, 2007, (R. at 1097) arguing nearly word for word the same argument they propound in 
Argument III of the Appellants' Brief found on pages 22 through 26. Further, Developers 
ignore the fact that Graffs responded to this objection outlining why the Developers' 
equitable claims were barred by the statute of frauds. (R. at 1140.) But most incredibly, 
Developers do not even mention the trial court's ruling that the equitable claims were in 
fact barred by the statute of frauds. (R. at 1151.) 
4
 The Graffs contend that this issue was not properly presented to the trial court prior to 
the trial court's hearing on the motion for summary judgment in the Developers 
Memorandum in Opposition, which is exclusively cited as the Developers' authority that 
the appealed issues were preserved. Therefore, the Developers have not preserved this 
issue for appeal. (See Argument 1(A) Supra.) However, out of an abundance of caution, 
the Graffs will address this issue. 
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Developers attempt to contort binding authority by stating that its equitable claims 
are not barred by the statute of frauds because: 
the statute of frauds defense applies only to actions related to a contract or 
agreement. In this case, Developers' unjust enrichment claim is not a tort 
action as discussed or briefed in the Graffs' summary judgment motion. 
More importantly, Developers' unjust enrichment claim does not relate to 
any contract or agreement, but rather, only to benefits unjustly retained by 
the Graffs. 
The only authority Developers rely on to establish that "the statute of frauds defense 
applies only to actions related to a contract or agreement" is a quote from Fericks v. Lucy 
Ann Soffe Trust, 100 P.3d 1200, 1204 (Utah 2004). The Developers state (mistakenly 
citing Stangl ) : 
We have stated that the operation of the statute [of frauds] is not confined 
to cases where an action is brought directly on the contract. Whatever the 
form of the action may be, if the proof of a promise or contract within the 
statute is essential to maintain it, there can be no recovery unless the statute 
is satisfied. 
Based on Stangle [sic], the key element in applying the statute of frauds to 
other tort actions is whether proof of a promise or contract within the 
statute is essential for maintaining that tort action. Again, the statute of 
frauds defense applies only to actions related to a contracl or agreement. 
(Appellants'Br. at 25) 
The first sentence of the quote completely contradicts the Developers' argument that "the 
statute of frauds defense applies only to actions related to a contract or agreement." The 
5
 Although the Developers point The Court to a Utah Supreme Court decision in F.C. 
Stangl v. Ernst Home Ctr., Inc., 948 P.2d 356 (Utah 1997) the actual quote is located in 
Fericks. The Graffs admitted to a lack of clarity in their original citation See footnote 2 of 
its Response to Developers Amended Objections to Graffs Purposed Order as Direct by 
the Court. (R. at 1133.) The Graffs take no responsibility for this second 
misrepresentation of authority. 
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requirement for a promise in Fericks stems not from the statute of frauds contained at 
U.C.A. §25-5-1, relating to interests in land, upon which the Graffs rely, but on an 
entirely different statute of frauds contained at U.C.A. §25-5-3 which relates to contracts. 
(See R. at 1129-1140 where Graffs fully briefed this issue to the trial court.) 
To further complicate the issue, Developers twist the facts of the case to make it 
appear as though some benefit was conferred upon the Graffs. 
Developers conferred benefits including but not limited to getting the 
Property annexed into the city of American Fork; acquiring all of the 
parcels necessary for the planned community; working to acquire access to 
the property, proper open space, surveys, and engineering so that the plat 
and planning could be approved; establishing relationships with city 
officials; paying hundreds of thousands of dollars in acquisition costs; and 
paying interest in carrying costs. 
(Appellants' Brief at 24.) 
In other words: the Developers encouraged the city of American Fork to annex the 
Graff Property. Developers acquired other land for a planned community. Developers 
worked to acquire - access to the planned community, plans for proper open spaces in the 
planned community, surveys for the planned community, and engineering for the planned 
community so that the plat and planning could be approved by the city of American Fork. 
Developers established relationships with city officials. Developers paid hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to acquire other land in the planned community and paid interest in 
carrying costs. Although the Developers qualify this list with the language "but not 
limited to" Developers fail to allege that anything of value was actually ever directly 
added to the Graff Property upon which an unjust enrichment claim might be brought. 
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Graffs fail to see how any of the actions listed above conferred a benefit upon 
them. Developers claim in their Statement of Facts, but not in their argument, that "[t]he 
Graffs knew Naterra was working to improve and increase the value of the Property, and 
they gladly accepted this benefit without cost to them." (Appellants' Br. at 8.) 
What the Graffs actually knew at the time Developers performed the actions that 
supposedly conferred benefits was that the Property was under contract with the 
Developers, that the Developers were working to establish a planned community, and that 
the property might become more valuable to the Developers. The Graffs made it 
abundantly clear in the second addendum to the Naterra REPC that Developers were to 
close no later than June 30, 2006, or in the event the Closing did not take place as 
required by the addendum, then the REPCs would automatically terminate as of the date 
on which closing should have taken place. (R. at 1 f 2.) 
Graffs now know that Developers did not close and the contract terminated by its 
own terms. Any work Developers did to increase the property value was done with only 
one real risk, e.g., the Developers would fail to close, and the Developers accepted this 
risk. Id. Any increase in property value was forfeited by the Developers due exclusively 
to the Developers breach of contract. 
This Court in an unpublished opinion found that "[i]f the benefit is considered to 
be the profit FHLM realized on the later sale of the property, this benefit was not 
conferred by Mckay Dee but the by the purchasing party." McKay Dee Credit Union v. 
Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp, 2008 WL 1970944 (Utah App. 2008). Likewise, 
without showing that anything of real value was added to the Graffs' Property in this 
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case, if the benefit is considered as only the increased property value, that is yet 
unrealized by the Graffs, that benefit will be conferred not by the Developers, but by the 
future purchasing party. 
Developers' claim for unjust enrichment must fail. The elements of an unjust 
enrichment claim are: 
First, there must be a benefit conferred by one person on another. Second, 
the conferee must appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit. Third, there 
must be acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such 
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit 
without payment of its value. 
Allen v. Hall 148 P.3d 939, 945 (Utah 2006). 
First of all, for a claim of unjust enrichment, the party claiming unjust enrichment 
must aver that they were the party that conferred a benefit on the opposing party. The 
only supposed benefits mentioned by the Developers were benefits that were conferred 
by the City of American Fork or a future purchaser of the property, not the Developers. 
Further, all of the benefits that Developers claim they conferred were given at a time 
when the property was under a valid, enforceable contract, and Developers forfeited their 
rights to the property when they beached the contract. 
Even if this Court were to find that Appellants had conferred some kind of 
tangible benefit on the Appellee's property, the analysis for unjust enrichment does not 
end there - there must be "acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under 
such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit." 
Consider a homeowner who expends a great deal of money landscaping her yard, and as a 
result, increases her neighborhood's property value. If this Court were just to consider 
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whether a benefit was conferred, this homeowner would have a cause of action for unjust 
enrichment against her neighbor since she, the homeowner, "conferred" a benefit on the 
neighbor by increasing the neighborhood's property value. Such a result, however, would 
be nonsensical. The homeowner's action was done for her own benefit and she cannot 
force her neighbor to pay part of the costs of landscaping her yard. It is not inequitable 
for the neighbor to retain the benefit conferred. 
Likewise Developers cannot sue the Graffs for the work that Developers expended 
in preparing the Project that might benefit the Graffs if the Developers failed. This is 
especially so since the Developers were the breaching party that let the Project fall 
through. Thus it is not inequitable for the Graffs to retain whatever benefits may have 
been conferred. Had Developers merely followed through with the terms of the written 
contract that they entered into, they would have received these perceived "benefits" 
themselves. 
Developers correctly state on page 24 of their Brief, that "[t]he [unjust 
enrichment] doctrine is designed to provide an equitable remedy where one does not exist 
at law. In other words, if a legal remedy is available, such as breach of an express 
contract, the law will not imply the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment. "Am. Towers 
Owners'Ass yn. v. CCI Mech., 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996). However, Developers 
fail to state that the only reason there is no remedy available to them at law is due to their 
breach of contract. 
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B. Max Graff did not not expressly and unambiguously waive the statute of 
frauds. 
The standard for overcoming the statute of frauds in the case of equitable claims is 
a limited one. While Medesco, Inc. v. LNA Intern. Inc., 762 F.Supp. 920, 926 (D. Utah 
1991) provided that the statute of frauds may be overcome when "enforcement of [an 
unwritten contract] is the only way to avoid injustice," Medesco has been overruled by 
Stangl to create an even more exacting standard: "A defendant is estopped from asserting 
the statute of frauds as a defense only when he or she has expressly and unambiguously 
waived the right to do so." F. C. Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 365 
(UtahApp. 1997). 
In Stangl the Utah Court of Appeals analyzed Judge Winder's opinion in Medesco 
and reasoned: 
The trial court in this case followed Medesco's reasoning, and, in effect, 
applied many of the elements of [The Restatement employed by Medesco]. 
Ernst argues that this approach is contrary to the law announced in 
Ravarino, Easton, and McKinnon and "would allow frustrated negotiators 
to claim promissory estoppel and seek damages for money spent in 
'anticipation' of a possible contract." We agree. 
The Utah Court of Appeals recognized the policy the court in Medesco subscribed to, but 
the Court of Appeals then noted: 
"Just as the statute of frauds should not be used to perpetrate fraud[,] so, 
too, promissory estoppel should not be allowed to eviscerate the Statute of 
Frauds." Medesco, 762 F.Supp. at 926. If this court were to reject prior 
Utah case law and adopt [Winder's approach] parties to a contract 
negotiation could not rely on the protections afforded by the Statute of 
Frauds, thereby "eviscerating" it. 
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Id. As a result, Utah law requires an express, unambiguous waiver of the statute of frauds 
before a party can be estopped from using the statute of frauds as a defense. 
Graffs statement "talk to my attorney concerning closing arrangements," even 
with "tone and body language," is hardly a clear and unambiguous waiver of the statute 
of frauds defense. (R. at 377-78.) Because all of Developer's remaining claims were 
rooted in this unenforceable agreement, and the statute of frauds was not waived by Max 
Graff, Developers' remaining equitable claims must fail. 
C. Even if the statute of frauds wasn't applicable, all of Appellants' claims 
would fail as a matter of law. 
Interestingly, Developers assert that Graffs have failed to sufficiently analyze each 
of their five counterclaims, while failing to assert in their motion in Opposition or even 
their Brief how they have met their burden of proving the elements of these 
counterclaims. (Appellant's Br. at 22-26.) While this is not the Appellees' burden, for the 
convenience of the Court, and in the interest of justice, the Appellee will address the 
elements of each of the Developers' other counterclaims and show how the Developers 
failed to satisfy each of them in turn: 
(1) Detrimental Reliance 
Developers' claim for detrimental reliance fails as a matter of law because non-
action does not count for detrimental reliance. 37 C.J.S., Statute of Frauds, § 250 (1943). 
6
 Detrimental reliance is an element of promissory estoppel. Waiver by estoppel has been 
defined by courts and commentators as requiring (1) conduct by the first party, (2) that 
leads the second party to the reasonable belief that a contract provision has been waived, 
and (3) detrimental reliance or a change in position by the second party." Valley Oil 
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Developers claim that their reliance was non-action - that they failed to close on 
the contract was their reliance on Max's statement "talk to my attorney concerning 
closing arrangements." Not only was this reliance non-action, bur there was also no 
detrimental reliance. Before Max's statement was even made, Developers had already 
breached the contract by not giving ten days notice. (R. at 1 ][ 2, 378 Tf 21.) The contract 
would have been breached with or without Max's statement. If anything, Developers 
detrimentally relied on themselves and not on the Graffs. 
(2) Fraud 
Developers' claim for fraud fails as a matter of law. The elements of fraud are as 
follows: 
(1) That a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew 
to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) 
and was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
Pace v. ParrisK 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952). 
Developers' fraud claim fails on nearly every element. Max Graff did make a 
representation (essentially telling Robinson to talk to Graffs' attorney concerning closing 
arrangements. (R. at 378, f^ 22 & 377,1f 26)) but this representation was not false. 
Technically, as an imperative it could not be false.7 Further, Developers can hardly be 
Tramp. Inc. v. Union Pacific R. Co. 2002 WL 1050089, 1 (Utah App.) (Utah App., 
2002). 
7
 "Imperative and Interrogative sentences...fail to be either true or false..." Susan Haack, 
Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge University Press, 1978. 
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said to have reasonably relied on that statement by failing to tender their willingness to 
close ten days before the scheduled deadline. In fact, this statement occurred two days too 
late for tendering that willingness to close under the contract, so by the time the 
representation was made there was no change in position for the Developers. (R. at 1, % 
2., 378 fflf 21-22.) Developers had already breached, and they would continue to breach. 
(3) Breach of Good Faith & Fair Dealing 
Developers' claim for Breach of Good Faith & Fair Dealing is without merit. "It is 
fundamental that, whether expressed or not, every contract includes a covenant of good 
faith with respect to dealings between the parties. The parties to a contract must deal 
fairly and honestly with each other." Fischer v. Johnson, Utah, 525 P.2d 45 (1974). Max 
Graff made no misrepresentation and dealt fairly and honestly with Robinson. The very 
fact that the Graffs were still willing to go into a fourth contract with Developers after 
over a year and a half of Developers failure to close shows that the Graffs wanted to sell 
the farm and hoped the deal would go through. That the Developers failed to meet the 
very clear terms of that agreement is not the fault of the Graffs or in any way a sign of 
dishonesty or unfair dealing. 
(4) Unjust Enrichment 
See argument 11(a) supra. 
(5) Conspiracy 
Plaintiffs failed to prove conspiracy. The following elements are necessary to 
prove civil conspiracy: "(1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be 
accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or 
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more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result thereof." Israel Pagan 
Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah App. 1987). 
There were no unlawful acts done by Graff, and if there were a combination or 
"two or more persons" it has not been factually alleged, unless Robinson believes he can 
prove that Graff was conspiring while he was "praying." (R. at 376 f 31, see also 
Appellants'Br. at 17.) 
III. APPELLANTS HAVE BROUGHT A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL IN 
CONTRAVENTION OF RULE 33 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE. 
Under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "a frivolous appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing 
law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." 
Further, "if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is 
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or 
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing 
party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's 
attorney." 
Hill, Johnson & Schmutz is, according to their website,8 "Utah County's Largest 
Law Firm" and should be charged to have knowledge of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. However, not only have Appellants, through their attorneys, brought an action 




Johnson & Schmutz submitted a Brief riddled with inaccuracies and entirely 
disorganized. Such unprofessional conduct on the part of Appellants' attorneys evinces a 
frivolous attitude that warrants Rule 33 sanctions. 
A. Appellants' Brief was "not grounded in fact not warranted by existing law, 
or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing 
law." 
Appellants Brief misrepresents the facts, relies on little or no applicable legal 
authority, and does not make a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing 
law. 
B. Appellants' attitude toward this appeal is evidenth frivolous as evidenced 
by the disorganized nature of Appellants' Brief and their failure to cite to or 
characterize the record accurately. 
Developers have evidenced a serious disregard for Appellee's time and the time of 
this Court by submitting a Brief that is entirely disorganized and fails to cite to the 
Record. Mackay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998). Like the cross appellant in Mackay 
whose brief was stricken for having "utterly failed to comply with [the Utah Supreme 
Court's] briefing requirements," this Court should "disregard issues raised" in 
Appellants' Brief for its utter disregard for this Court's time and its briefing rules. Id. at 
947. 
Failure to comply with briefing rules is sufficient reason to disregard arguments 
found in a brief. Id. at 947-949. In Mackay, cross appellant's brief had numerous defects, 
among them that it 
fail[ed] to correctly cite to the original record as paginated pursuant to rule 
11(b) of [the Court's] rules of appellate procedure ....fail[ed] to support 
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some of the arguments with citations to relevant authorities...[and it was] 
not presented with accuracy.. .[and] not logically arranged. 
Id. at 947-49. Because of its defects, the Court in Mackay struck the cross appellant's 
brief in its entirety. The Utah Supreme Court went on to explain the paramount interest 
behind the briefing rules that "were fashioned in part to lower the costs of litigation and 
maximize judicial economy by facilitating communication between parties and this court. 
Failure to comply with our rules hinders the judicial process." Id. at 949. 
Like the cross appellant's brief in Mackay, Appellants' Brief also "fails to 
correctly cite to the original record as paginated.. .fails to support some of the arguments 
with citations to relevant authorities... [is] not presented with accuracy, [and] not 
logically arranged." Id. at 947-49. 
1. Appellants' illogical arrangement of arguments 
Appellant's Brief was not logically arranged. First there was technical 
disorganization: while the first "argument" was a statement of the standard of review, 
there were two arguments numbered "II." (Appellants' Br. at 15, 18.) Beyond the 
technical problems, the Appellants' only basis for their arguments was the result of 
mischaracterizing and twisting the record, which will be set forth more fully below. 
2. Appellant fails to cite to the record as paginated 
Appellants failed to cite to the Record properly throughout their entire Brief, in 
excess of 100 erroneous citations to the Record. Appellee's efforts to find the correct 
citations to the Record have been time-consuming and frustrating, with the Appellee 
finding few, if any, citations that are accurate. 
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3. Appellant fails to cite relevant authorities 
Further, many citations are lacking entirely because the Order and the transcript 
are missing from the Record - at least the Order was missing at the time Developers' 
submitted their Brief. Many of the Developers' contentions rest on a lack of treatment in 
oral argument, repeatedly alleging "Developers' equitable claims were neither briefed nor 
argued." (Appellants' Br. at 13, 25-26). There is, however, no authority to back this 
contention, since the Developers certified that a transcript of oral argument was 
unnecessary for their appeal. (R. at 1187.) Most disturbing, Developers make no 
reference or citation to the Order they are appealing from, which Order was not even in 
the Record at the time that Developers submitted their brief. (R. at 1262-73.) 
Worse than using irrelevant authority, Developers used no authority at all in many 
of their material contentions. Developers frequently misrepresented the Record through 
asserting that both parties were in agreement on certain material facts. Page 20 of 
Developers' Brief states "The Graffs do not dispute that there was an oral agreement 
reached between David and Max. It is further undisputed that Developers acted in 
reliance on that agreement.../' Both contentions were disputed by Graffs (R. at 1272, ^  
1), but the Developers, unable to provide actual evidence for these propositions, instead 
used inaccurate, conclusory statements, with no citations to the Record. 
4. Appellants' inaccuracies & mischaracterizations 
There were many other inaccuracies and mischaracterizations of the Record. Note 
the following mischaracterizations of material facts. 
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a. Max's Statements 
First, Developers in their Brief repeatedly mischaracterize key conversations 
between Max Graff and David Robinson, specifically mischaracterizing Max Graffs 
words by addition of some form of the word "extension." 
On page 378 of the record, David Robinson avers, 
Max Graff represented to me that I should contact Don D. Gilbert the 
Graffs' attorney to work things out concerning closing arrangements. 
(Emphasis added.) Careful scrutiny of this sentence reveals no mention by Max Graff of 
the word extension. The nearest possible reference in Robinson's affidavit to an 
extension is Robinson's averment further down on page 378, in paragraph 23, that 
[Max's] tone and body language also reflected the same willingness to 
continue with the sale and grant some form of extension. 
(Emphasis added). Not only does Robinson admit that any agreement was only for "some 
form of extension," but Robinson never avers that the words "extension" ever came out 
of Max's mouth. 
This is curiously different than the Appellants' characterization of the 
conversation in their Brief. According to Appellants' Brief, Max tells David on page 10 
to contact Don 
to work out an extension and closing arrangements 
and on page 21 Max tells David to contact Don to 
work out details about closing the transaction or extending the closing deadline. 
Somewhere in the translation between the Record and Appellants' Brief, the words "and 
extension" or "or extending" magically - and conveniently - appear. Perhaps this is 
35 
understandable since the Appellants failed to cite to the Record accurately to begin with. 
See Argument 111(B)(2), supra. 
The added "extension" misrepresentation continues with another conversation 
referred to on page 11 of the Appellants' Brief. Developers' attorneys state: 
Max indicated that he had not heard from Gilbert and again told David that 
he should continue to attempt to contact Gilbert concerning extension and 
closing arrangements. 
Paragraph 26 of Robinson's affidavit, however, simply states: 
Max Graff indicated that he had not heard from Gilbert and again 
represented that I should just continue to attempt to contact Gilbert 
concerning closing arrangements. 
Again, Max makes no mention of the word "extension" in David's affidavit, but it 
appears in Developers' Brief. 
On page 13 of the Brief, Developers' go even farther to puts words in Max's 
mouth that were never there: 
Developers partially performed pursuant to their agreement with Max 
Graff to wait and rely on Graffs' attorney, Don Gilbert, for closing and 
extension instructions. 
(Emphasis added.) Not only is the word "extension" once more put in Max's mouth, but 
an elaborate agreement in which Max tells Robinson to "wait and rely" on Gilbert for 
extension instructions. This gravely goes beyond Max's "voice tone and body language," 
and is a very inappropriate mischaracterization of the Record. 
Finally, Developers' mischaracterizations were not limited to the nature of the 
agreement. Another key conversation between Max and David is mischaracterized on 
Page 17 of the Developers' Brief that goes to the "heart" of Developers' alleged unjust 
enrichment and fraud claims: 
Max wanted Naterra to go out of contract because Max felt that the Graffs 
could sell the property for more money due to the improvements that 
Developers made on the property (obtaining city approvals, appraisals, 
rezoning, etc.). (R. at 1007.) This is the heart of the Developers unjust 
enrichment claim. 
(Emphasis added.) While page 1007 does not contain anything like that statement, a 
similar passage appears nearby in the Robinson affidavit on page 1004, paragraph 31, 
though it is noticeably different: 
At the July 5, 2006 meeting between myself, Naterra, Gilbert and the 
Graffs, Max Graff informed me while we were walking together that he had 
been praying that the sale would go into default so he could get more 
money. 
Nowhere in the Record does Max refer to getting "more money due to the 
improvements" at all. The heart of the Developers' unjust enrichment claim, then, relies 
on a mischaracterization of the Record, as Max's statement does not refer to the 
improvements at all. (Appellants' Br. at 17.) This entirely disregards the fact that the 
Property may be worth more money simply because for a year and a half the land has 
been increasing in value while the Developers were failing to follow through on the sale 
of the property. 
Such mischaracterization of Graff s statements that surround the alleged extension 
and unjust enrichment - issues central to Developers' claims - is intentionally misleading 
and untenable. 
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b. Ready, willing, and able to close 
Second, Developers mischaracterize the Record with regards to their being "ready, 
willing, and able to close." The Developers attempt to persuade the Court that they were 
ready willing and able to close through "hard money" lenders even though the 
Developers had not yet obtained city approvals or various appraisals. (Appellants' Br. at 
10.) Developers omit, however, that they also "informed Max Graff that due to delays... 
the closing... would need to be deferred into the first part of July 2006." (R. at 378, f^ 8) 
(emphasis added). There is no evidence in the Record to support any assertion that the 
Developers indicated to the Graffs that they had any ability to close on June 30, 2006 
using "hard money" lenders or any other alternative. The Developers, using paragraphs 
15 and 18, with no specific reference to any date or a particular conversation, in 
conjunction with paragraph 21, with a specific date and in reference to a specific 
conversation, are spinning two separate and distinct references to infer that Max Graff 
understood that the Developers were ready, willing and able to close on June 30, 2006. 
However, only one conversation, that is to say, the critical, specific, and dated, 
conversation, was clear in its meaning: "The Developers need to defer the closing." (R. at 
378,H8.) 
c. 10 day notice 
Which brings Appellees to the third misrepresentation: the Appellants' failure to 
include the necessity of a 10 day notice before closing. (R. at 1, f 2.) One of the 
contingencies listed in paragraph 2 is that "Buyer to provide Sellers at least 10 days 
notice prior to Closing." Id. This was clear in the contract and yet eight days before the 
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closing the only sign of the Developers' readiness for closing was the statement that they 
needed "to defer the closing." (R. at 378, Tj 8.) Despite the requirement of 10 days notice, 
Developers claim in their Brief that it was Graffs' duty to contact them concerning 
closing arrangements. (Appellants' Br. at 11, 16, "Naterra was ready, willing, and able to 
close. But neither Gilbert nor Graffs scheduled a closing for June 30, 2006....Neither 
Gilbert nor Max informed Naterra of any closing instructions or arrangements for closing 
prior to or on June 30, 2006.") 
d. "happily accepted" 
Finally, Appellant on both pages 7 and 8 of the Record state "the Graffs.. .happily 
accepted—Gateway's efforts." However, the Record contains no evidence that the Graffs 
"happily accepted" anything, whether on the pages cited by Appellants or on any page of 
David Robinson's affidavit. (R. at 375-83.) 
e. undisputed arguments 
As mentioned above, Page 20 of Appellants' Brief states "The Graffs do not 
dispute that there was an oral agreement reached between David and Max. It is further 
undisputed that Developers acted in reliance on that agreement..." Both contentions were 
disputed by Appellees, they were only held as true for the purposes of the motion for 
summary judgment. (R. at 977, "Even if the claims made by the Developers are true (as 
Graffs allow only for this Motion), Developers cannot escape enforcement of the 
Statute of Frauds...." (Emphasis added.)) 
Note also that the Developers' own Brief is internally inconsistent on this point. 
Despite the language that "Graffs do not dispute that there was an oral agreement,..." 
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page 15 of Developers' Brief begins with the heading: "WHETHER THE GRAFFS 
EXTENDED THE CLOSING DEADLINE IS A DISPUTED MLATERIAL FACT." The 
very next line repeats the same proposition: "The parties dispute whether they agreed to 
extend the closing deadline." Thus, not even the Developers are consistent in their story 
of whether or not this fact was actually disputed or not. 
f. "neither briefed nor argued" 
Appellants on page 13 of their Brief claim that "Developer's equitable claims 
were neither briefed nor argued, so the trial court should not have ruled on them." 
First it should be pointed out that there is no way for the Developers to claim that 
such claims were not "argued" since they certified that a transcript of the oral arguments 
was unnecessary. (R. at 1187.) 
Second, the fact that those claims weren't properly briefed (or possibly even 
argued) before the trial court ruled on the motion was the fault of the Developers 
themselves for failing to raise those issues in their Opposition to Graffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. See Argument I, supra. 
And finally, this statement itself in Appellant's Brief is incredibly disingenuous 
because the Developers submitted their Opposition to Graffs proposed Order, which 
included nearly word-for-word the same arguments presented in Argument III of 
Developers' Brief. (R. at 1119-27; Appellants' Br. at 22-26.) Thus, both arguments were 
considered by the trial court prior to the court issuing its Order. Specifically, at the 
conclusion of oral argument the court ruled in favor of Graffs' motion from the bench 
and ordered Graffs to prepare the Order. Then Developers' submitted their Opposition to 
Graffs' proposed Order, which contained Developers' equitable arguments. The trial 
court then specifically instructed to Graffs to address the equitable arguments—including 
unjust enrichment—raised by Developers. (R. at 1129-40.) Further, the trial court 
considered those arguments and overruled Developers' objection to the Order because the 
court was "unpersuaded" by the Developers' arguments and "persuaded with the 
Response of Plaintiffs." (R. at 1150-51.) To say that Developers' equitable claims "were 
neither briefed nor argued," is simply not as straightforward as Developers claim. 
5. Conclusion & Call for attorney fees 
Like the cross appellant in Mackay, Appellants have, through their Brief, 
"hinder[ed] the judicial process." Id. at 949. Appellants' poorly cited and unorganized 
Brief "increased the costs of litigation for both parties and unduly burdened the 
judiciary's time and energy." Id. Appellants utterly failed to cite to the Record, not only 
failing to cite the Order from which they were appealing, but, after certifying that a 
transcript would not be necessary, Appellants proceeded to make arguments based on 
what occurred at oral argument, knowing that they could not cite any authority to back up 
their contentions. Like the cross-appellees in Mackay, Appellants' failure "to comply 
with [the Utah Supreme Court's] briefing rules..." caused Appellee to "expend additional 
attorney fees in responding." Id. Therefore, like the brief in Mackay that was stricken for 
noncompliance with the Court rules, this Court should "disregard the issues raised therein 
pursuant to rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." Id. Consistent with 
Rules 24 and 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court should dismiss 
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Appellants' Brief, and order that Appellants and/or its counsel pay attorney's fees for 
bringing a frivolous appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons the Court should dismiss this appeal and order the Appellants 
and/or their Attorneys to pay double the Appellees' costs and reasonable attorney's fees 
for defending this frivolous appeal. 
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APPENDIX B 
NOTICE OF INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
EM 9 0 6 4 3 : 2 0 0 6 K 1 of 2 
RANDALL A . COVINGTON 
UTAH COUNTY RECORDER 
200* ] g l 18 12:23 an FEE 15,00 BY SW 
RECORDED FOR SELECT TITLE INSURANCE AGEtl 
ELECTRONICALLY RECDStEO 
Notice is hereby given that the undersigned has an interest in that certain real property 
situated in Utah County, State of Utah, described as follow®: 
COMMENCING NORTH 1353.83 FEET & WEST 433.11 FEET FROM THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF 
SECTION 24, TOWNSHlP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE & MERIDIAN; THENCE SOUTH 
89 DEG 59*57* WEST 632.C1 FEET; THENCE NORTH C DEG 21*18" EAST 365.42 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 
BS DEG 51'38* EAST 523.96 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 0 DEC- 54'40" EAST 363.93 FEET TO BEGINNING. 
AkaTax Serial No. 13-5S-57. AREA APPROX 5.257 ACRE. 
COMMENCING NORrH 1353.83 FEET & WEST 1065.09 FEET -ROM SOUTHEAS" CORNER OF 
SECTION 24, TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH. RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE S MERIDIAN; THENCE NORTH 
89 DEG 59*58" WEST 1075.96 FEET; THENCE NORTH 0 DEG 21*34" EAST 368 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 
89 DEG 51*43" EAST 1075.92 FEET; ThENCE SOUTH 0 DEG 2122" WEST 365.43 FEET TO BEG. 
Aka Tax Serial No. 13-59-58. AREA APPROX 9.058 ACRE. 
COMMENCING NORTH 1009.31 FEET & WEST 427.62 FEET FROM THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF 
SECTION 24, TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST. SALT LAKE BASE & MERIDIAN; THENCE NORTH 
89 DEG 26'11"W 634,98 FEET; THENCE NORTH 0 DEG 2T28" EAST 338 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 89 
DEG 59*57* EAST 857.34 FEET: THENCE S 0 DEG 54*50" EAS" 344.57 FEET TO BEGINNING. 
Tax Serial No. 13-59-55. AREA A3»ROX 5.'79 ACRE. 
COMMENCING NORTH 1015.8* =EET& WEST 1082.2 FEET FROM THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF 
SECTION 24, TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE & MERIDIAN; THENCE NORTH 
89 DEG 267" WEST 1C50.62 FEET; THENCE NORTH 0 DEG 21"28T EAST 327.53 FEET; THENCE NORTH 
89 DEG 59'5S* EAST 1050.33 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 0 DEG 21*28" WEST 338 FEET TO BEGINNING, 
Tax Serial No. 13-59-54. AREA APPROX 8.027 ACRE. 
Said interest arises in connection with purchase agreements with respective owners, 
m 9 0 6 4 3 : 2 0 0 6 K 2 of 2 
Sy; 
BUYER 
Gateway Farms, LLC 
Steven G, Black, Manager 
Niters West, LLC 
By: 
StavsifG. Black, Manager 
State of Utah, Utah County; 
On July 18, 2008r before me, the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared 
Steven 6, Black, Manager of Gateway Farms, LLC, personalty known to ma {or 
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person{s) whose name{s} 
is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they 
executed the same in his/her/their authorized capacity{ies) and that by his/her/their 
signature{$) on the instrument the person(s) or the entity upon behalf of which the 
pftrftftfiffi ati&d] ^rfrQnfpfl fhP fryftfr,llT<5>nt 
KRiSTYKBXEV 
mrmtn^m * STATE & #w 
4 » €. STATE fHXSTE.1fiOG 
mm\cm ?mK UT MOB 
COMM. EXP, 1-8-2008 
State of Utah, Utah County; 
On July 18, 2008, before me, the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared 
Steven G, Black, Manager of Naterra West LLC, personally known to me (or 
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person(s) whose name(s) 
is/ere subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they 
executed the same m his/her/their authorized capacity(ies) and that by his/her/their 
signature(s) on the instrument the person(s) or the entity upon behalf of which the 
person(s) acted, executed the instrument. 
KRISTY KELLEY 
450 E. STATE RD. STE ISCO 
AMERICAN FORK, UT «* *» 
COMM. BOP. t *2008 
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APPENDIX C 
MARK L. ANDERSON, NO. 0105 
MICHAEL L. NIXON, NO. 7589 
977 South Orem Blvd 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-9677 
Facsimile: (801) 224-8909 
Attorney for Plaintiffs MAX B. GRAFF; 
ANITA B. GRAFF; CURTIS A. GRAFF; 
CAROL A. GRAFF; GRAFF RANCHES, LC; 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MAX B. GRAFF; ANITA B. GRAFF; 
CURTIS A. GRAFF; CAROL A. GRAFF; 
GRAFF RANCHES, LC; 
Plaintiffs; 
Vs. 








MAX B. GRAFF; ANITA B. GRAFF; 
CUTIS A. GRAFF; CAROL A. GRAFF; 
GRAFF RANCHES, LC; DON D. GILBERT 
Counterclaim Defendants 
AMENDED ORDER 
Case Number: 060402272 
Division No 5 
Judge: Fred D. Howard 
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PLAINTIFFS MAX B. GRAFF, ANITA B. GRAFF, CURTIS A. GRAFF, and CAROL 
A. GRAFF, AND GRAFF RANCHES LC ("Graffs") filed a motion for summary 
judgment by and through their counsel Mark L. Anderson. Said Motion was made 
pursuant to rule 56 U.R.P.C. and moved the court for summary judgment against 
Defendant Naterra West, LLC; Plaintiffs in Intervention, Gateway Farms LLC and 
Fusion Group LLC, (hereinafter "Developers"). Its accompanying memorandum dated 
February 1, 2007 supported this motion. The Developers filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition, and Graffs responded with their Reply Memorandum. Graffs filed a Notice 
to Submit. 
On May 14, 2007, this Court held a hearing on the issues presented to it on said 
Motion. 
Now having heard the arguments, and having carefully considered all of the 
submissions, the Court: 
HEREBY FINDS, CONCLUDES AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND ORDERS 
as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. Even though the parties dispute the existence of an oral agreement to extend the 
closing date as between Developers and Graffs, when considering the 
Developer's factual allegations as true, the alleged oral agreement regarding an 
extension, as between Max Graff and the Developers, contained terms that were 
far from clear. 
2. The words contained in the alleged oral agreement (judged in the light most 
favorable to the Developers) do not address whether an extension was granted, or 
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for how long, but suggest at best, "some form of an extension " 
3 The words contained m the alleged oral agreement are not cleai and definite 
4 The words allegedly spoken by Max Graff to Developer David Robinson, at the 
time of the alleged oral agreement, do not amount to an express waiver of the 
statute of frauds 
5 Notwithstanding, even assuming an oral agreement existed the Developers' 
claims and/or causes of action should be dismissed because 
a Developer's failuie to close on June 30, 2006 was not arguably shown as 
exclusively based on reliance upon on the alleged oral agreement 
b The court notes that the fact that Developers did not close on June 30, 
2006 arguably could have occurred for other reasons, e g the lack of 
funding, a decision not to go forward with the transaction, or other 
reasons wholly apart from the alleged oral agreement 
c This failure to show the alleged oral agieement as the sole basis for the 
Developers non-action of not closing bars Developers' claims as such 
claims are prohibited by Utah Law 
6 It is the general rule in Utah, to avoid enforcement of the Statute of Frauds, that 
the part performance, or reliance, upon an oral agreement, may not be mere non-
action Here, the mere non-action of failing to close is insufficient to allow 
allegations of part performance to prevail In terms of setting aside the Statute 
of Frauds, non-action is not part performance, and Utah law does not support 
reliance upon non-action as part performance 
7 The allegations of part-peiformance m terms of calling the Graffs' attorney and 
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sending him e-mail are insufficient part performance because these are not 
substantial and are "word oriented" not "acts oriented." 
8. In addition, it would be expected, that contact with Graffs attorney would occur 
(e.g. he was to prepare the closing documents, etc.) and therefore the e-mail and 
phone calls were not adequately shown as exclusively based on reliance upon on 
the alleged oral agreement. 
9. The present case has multiple claims and multiple parties. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. The Utah Legislation has enacted U.C.A. 1953 (as amended) §25-5-1, and U.C.A. 
1953 (as amended) § 25-5-3 which speak to Utah's Statute of Frauds, these Statutes are 
controlling law in this case. 
2. It is the general rule in Utah that the part performance, or reliance, upon an oral 
agreement, may not be mere non-action. The non-action of failing to close is insufficient 
to allow allegations of part performance to prevail. Therefore, in this regard Developers' 
claims or arguments cannot prevail. 
3. In terms of setting aside the Statute of Frauds, non-action is not part performance, 
and Utah law does not support reliance upon non-action (as in failing to close) as part 
performance. Therefore, in this regard Developers' claims or arguments cannot prevail. 
4. Developers' failure to arguably show the alleged oral agreement as the sole basis 
for the non-action of not closing prohibits Developers' claims under Utah Law. 
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Therefore, in this regard Developers' claims or arguments cannot prevail. 
5. In order to set aside the Statute of Frauds, the party asserting the Statute of Frauds 
as a defense must be shown to have clearly and expressly waived the Statute of Frauds as 
a defense. There is no showing that occurred. Therefore, in this regard Developers 
claims or arguments cannot prevail. 
6. An oral agreement, which pertains to the sale of real property, which contains 
terms, which are not clear and definite, cannot prevail. Therefore, in this regard 
Developers' arguments fail. 
7. hi this matter the alleged oral agreement cannot eviscerate the Statue of Frauds. 
Therefore, in this regard Developers' arguments fail. 
8. In this matter the alleged part performance cannot eviscerate the Statue of Frauds. 
Therefore, in this regard Developers' arguments cannot prevail. 
9. The Statute of Frauds controls the parties' rights and obligations in this matter. 
Therefore, in this regard Developers' arguments cannot prevail. 
10. For these reasons all of the Developers' claims and causes of action, as raised in 
their pleadings, including 1) the Naterra West LLC counterclaim, 2) Intervening 




A. Detrimental Reliance, 
B. Fraud, 
C. Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 
D. Unjust Enrichment, 
E. Conspiracy, 
F. Claim for Damages, attorney's fee(s), etc. 
G. Claim for Specific Performance. 
11. For these reasons, described above, any and all of the Developers' filings, as 
described in the Order below, consisting of Lis Pendens, or Notice of Interest, or any 
other filing on the Graffs' Real Property, (Real Property is the property which has been in 
dispute, and/or has been described in the parties pleadings) filed in any governmental 
location, Recorder's office, or Court, which in any way has, or may have affected, 
encumbered or clouded the title to the Real Property which has been m dispute in this 
matter, all such Developers' filings should be hereby declared null and void, without any 
legal force or effect of any of kind. 
12. But for the Graffs' remaining claims in the present case, this Order, without 
being made final pursuant to Rule 54(b) would become immediately appealable. 
13. Although there is some overlap in the facts that underlie the Developers' 
counterclaims and the Graffs' remaining claims, that the difference is significant enough 
as to both facts and parties that this order shall not have a res judicata effect on the 
remaining claims in this case. 
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14. The rights of the parties in this case will not be significantly abridged by making 
this Order 'Tmal" within the meaning of U.R.C.P. 54 (b). Further, by making this order 
final, there is a high likelihood that the parties will be able to move forward with an 
appeal of this order more quickly (if they so choose), thereby allowing the appellate 
process give certain direction as to the disposition of the subject property (if any direction 
is necessary) in a more timely manner, than if the parties were to wait until the final 
adjudication of the remaining claims. Therefore the Court finds that there is no just 
reason for delay in making this Order final. 
ORDER: 
1. The Graffs' Motion for Summary Judgment against the Developers regarding the 
above described matter is granted. 
Therefore, all of the Developers' claims and causes of action, as raised in their 
pleadings, including 1) the Naterra West LLC counterclaim, 2) Intervening Complaint, of 
Gateway Farms LLC. and Fusion Group LLC fail. 
These include: 
A. Detrimental Reliance, 
B. Fraud, 
C. Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 
D. Unjust Enrichment, 
E. Conspiracy, 
F. Request for Damages, attorney's fee(s), etc. 
G. Request for Specific Performance. 
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2. There are no genuine issues of material fact, so judgment as a matter of law is 
appropriate. 
3. All causes of action, or any other claims, as noted above, and as raised in any of 
the Developer's pleadings are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Any and all of the Developers' filings of Notice of Interest (including but not 
limited to the NOTICE OF INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY, dated and filed on July 
18, 2006, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A"), of Lis Pendens (including 
but not limited to the NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS, dated August 9, 2006, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B") or any other filing on the Graffs' Real Property, 
(Real Property is the property which has been in dispute, and/or has been described in the 
parties pleadings) filed in any governmental location, Recorder's Office, or Court, which 
in any way has, or may have affected, encumbered or clouded the title to the Real 
Property which has been in dispute in this matter, all such Developers' filings are hereby 
declared null and void, without any legal force or effect of any of kind and title to said 
Real Property is hereby quieted in favor of the Graffs as against any and all claims the 
Developers have, had or may have pertaining to this law suit with all rights, title and 
interest of the Real Property remaining with the Graffs and no rights of any kind inuring 
to the benefit of the Developers. 
5. The previous Motion to Nullify Liens as filed by Donald Gilbert on behalf of the 
Graffs is granted 
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6. For the reasons stated above and those contained in the Graffs' memorandum m 
support of the motion to amend the July 10, 2007 Order (incorporated by reference 
herein, This Order is Final within the meaning of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure and hereby certified for appeal. 
DATED this /'J day of January, 2008. 
in i in n HI if r: 
^ /< 
u-4 n 
The Honorable, Fr f^l D. Hifwsf 
Fourth District Court Judge 
f 





Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the j | day of January 2008 I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED ORDER to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid or 
hand delivered to the following: 
HILL JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Charles L. Perschon 
River View Plaza, Suite 300 
4844 North 300 West 
Provo, UT 84604 
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
125 North 100 West 
Provo, UT 84601 
/-—-^Larry Hardenbrook, Office Manager 
TWLAW OFFICE OF MARK L. ANDRSON 
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